Phonebanking by Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A.
~,~ Discussion






by Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse
October 1994
[.i~ v l, i. r~1~.t~C t` ~-- ~
~~1Ciri,~.i-f ~~ c'? t.~~,.~{.
~~:a, ~~.ra:~
.L',',. .:ei ` ,.., ...
ISSN 0924-7815
~ . . ~
h 1
2, h~







CentER for Economic Research,
Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
Hans Degryse
Centrum voor Economische Studién,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium
September 29, 1994
'Cornspondence to: Jan Bouckaert, CentER for Economic Reeearch, Tilburg Univereity, P.O. Bmc
90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlande. Telephone t3113883050, Telefax t3113883068, email bouck-
aer(~kub.nl. We would like to thank Helmut Beeter, Eric van Damme, Mathiaa Dewatripont and Patrick
Van Cayeeele for their advicee. Harry Webere provided ueeful commente. We akw benefited from eom-
mente received at the CEPR-BBV Conference oa Induetrial Organisation and Finance, San Sebastian
1994 and the diecuasant Bernard Beneaid.Abetract
In a two-stage game, we study under what conditions banks will offer the option for
phonebanking (first atage). In the second stage, they are competitors in the market
for deposits. Wc solve the game for its subgame per[ect Nash equilibria in pure
strategies (SPNE). Depositors value a phonebank since it facilitates acceas to their
account. A phonebank, then, has a qualitative advantage vis-à-vie its non-phone
competitor, since all depositors strictly prefer to manage some of their financial
transactíons by phone. Competition, however, accelerates, since banks compete
more strenuously íor the same depoaitors. Different SPNE emerge dependent on
the magnitude of the financial transactions types. Specialization can occur in that
one bank offers the phone option while the other dces not.
Keywords : Banking Competition, Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics.
JEL-Classification : D21, D42, D43.1
1 Introduction.
Technological innovation over the past decade redesigned the art of competitíon in a
number of industries. The existence of technological change in the banking industry can
be widely observed. Examples include banks' automated teller machinea, the procesaing
of cash and account transactions. Silber (1983) offers an overview and theory of the
process of 1`~nancial innovations. His main hypothc~ia is that ~new financial practices are
innovated to lessen the financial constraints imposed on firma" (p.89). Both external and
internal constraints are at the origin of their innovative activity. Recently, the innovation
'phonebanking' appeared as a nbanking facility which can be accessed remotely by a
customer via his or her telephone. [Tele]phone banking usually provides the customer
with access to a synthesized or digital voice via a touch-tone pad" (Essinger (1992),
p.152-3). The number of banks offering this kind of accesa hae increased substantially
during the recent past. In Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden,
virtually all major banks offer phonebanking. The percentage of these banks' depositots
using this innovation ranges from 2 to 15 for Belgium, 3 to 50 for France and 3 to
100 for the United Kingdom.' Phonebanking facilitiea include, for example, atatement
and check book ordering, third party payments and up to date account information.
A formally equivalent idea has already been in existence for some time: depositors use
enveloppes to order their financial transactions by mail. This paper atudies the atmtegic
effects of phonebanking as an option for clients to execute their financial transactiona
when banks are competitors in the market for depoaits. In this way, innovation in the
financial services industry is the result of strategic positioning.
Heffernan (1992) computes the interest equivalence for a list of nonprice characteristics
of bank products but excludes the phone option from that liat. Use of phonebanking as a
competitive device in banking is widely acknowledged, however. Some banks inteneively
advertise the phonebank option as a device to bring banking services closer to their
clients. By encouraging this, banks expect to increase their market share, to pay lower
deposit rates and hence to increase their profits. Phonebank technology givea depoaitore
more flexibility in their financial management. Depositors, for example, may reduce their
travelling costs. The paper considers a spatial duopoly and analyzes whether banks will
1For an overview of the importance of phonebanking, see BEUC ( 1992) and BIS (1993).2
offer phonebanking to their clients or not and what the effecta upon their market ahares,
deposit rates and profits will be.
A deposit market with related financial services is modelled as a two-etage game. In
the firat stage, banks decide whether to introduce the phonebanking option or not. In
the second stage, banks compete in deposit rates. We apply a model related to the Salop
(1979) circle model. Depositors have the option to exercise some financial traneactiona
either at the branch of their bank or by use of the phone option. Uaing the phone option
has the same cost for every depositor. Graphically, the phone option can be modelled as
the center of a circle : the radius is the same for every point on the circle. Henriet and
Rochet (1991) consider a aimilar framework to analyze competition in the distribution
of insurance. Insurance intermediaries are located along the circle and a direct writer ia
located at the center of the circle. The cost to approach the direct writer is uniformly
high for all buyers of insurance (represented by the length of the radius). This property ia
tranalated to our phonebanking model. Each depositor, being a client at a bank offering
the phone option, has the opportunity to exercise some of hia or her transactiona at a
fixed cost. Real-world observation teachea ua that banka introduced a phone number per
phone area such that the cost for a depoaitor to use the phone option is the same for
all depositors irrespective of their location. In our model, depositora value a phonebank
since it facilitates access to their account and reducee their trnnsaction costa to manage
their account when they use the phone option. Depoaitors are willing to accept lower
interest rates on their depoaits in order to become clienta at a phonebank and, hence, to
receive higher quality financial services.
In a more general interpretation, the phone optíon represents a technology facilitating
the accessability to an account at a fixed cost. Checka, debit- and credit cards are
examples of this technology: payments can be made at a fixed coat. Thia paper then
offers an answer to the more general question: do banks have an incentive to introduce
a technology facilitating access to an account at a fixed cost ?
We solve this game for its subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategiea. Differ-
ent equilibria emerge according to the relative importance of the financial transactions.
When depositors exercise transactions from only their location on the circle (i.e. location-
specific transactions), introduction of the phone option can conatitute an equilibrium for
our game. When depositors exercise financial transactiona only when they are randomly3
located on the circle (i.e. non-location-specific tronsactions), at least one bank intro-
duces the phone option. Combining all possible financial transactiona, we find that
specialization can occur in that one bank offera the phone option while the other doea
not.
The paper takes the existence of the banking fitm as a given and focuses only on
its liability side. We investigate the strategic effecta of an off-balance-sheet activity, i.e.
phonebanking as a financial service, upon the competition in the market for depoaits.
Padilla and Matutes (1993) address a different topic, the effect of ATM compatibility on
banking competition in the deposit market. They show that either full incompatibility
or partial compatibility occurs. Full compatibility never conatitutes a Perfect Coalition-
Proof Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A coalition of two compatible banka vetoes
full compatibility since the competitive effects dominate the increase in network ef-
fects. Phonebanking however, contains no network effecta, eince the cost of executing a
transaction by phone is independent of the number of banka offering the phone option.
Therefore, we do not need more than two banks for the analyais.
The rest of the paper is organized as followa. Section 2 preaente the model. Section
8 offers the solution of the game and interprets the resulta. Section 4 concludea.
2 A model of spatial phonebanking competition on
the circle.
Two banks A and B, each consisting of a aingle branch,1 are located on a circle with
unit circumference. By convention, they are located at distance 1 from each other.3
G insert Figure 1 ~
Banks compete for the cleposits of individuals located along the circle. Competition
is modelled as a two-stage game. At stage one, banks simultaneously decide whether to
offer their depositors the phone option or not. The introduction of this technology is at
zero marginal cost for both banks. We assume that the proceaeing coat for the bank of a
transaction executed by phone or at a branch is the same. Thia cost ia normalized at zero.
~One could think of a town or a district where a bank opene only one branch.
gThie apecific location aetting will generate analagoue conclusione as in a traditional HotelGng model
where banks A and B are located at 0 and 1, renpectively.4
At stage two, given the decision by the two banks about stage one, they simultaneoualy
set deposit rates r;, with i- A, B. Deposits are inveated and generate a fixed return
R~ r;. The profit of bank i is rr; -(R - r;)y with y the amount of depoaits attracted.
Depositors are uniformly distributed with density one along the circle and competition
is such that all depositors open a deposit account. Each depositor inveats on average
one norrnalized unit of money at only one of the two banks.
Depositors exercise a fixed number of four different financial transactiona (see Table
I).4
C insert Table 1 ~
The first two kinds arise when the depositor is at his home location. We call these
location-specífic. Each depositor has a well-defined location (i.e. his home location) and
from this point he exercises H branch-speci,fic and h non-branch-specifte transactïons.
Examples of branch-specifxc transactions are deposits or withdrawals ofcash which clearly
need a visit to the branch. A depositor located at z visita ita branch always via the
shortest arc length implying a transportation cost k-~ tz, with k~ 0 as the constant
term and t 1 0 the per-unit distance parameter. An economic interpretation for k is
the average cost in waiting time that every depositor íncurs before getting served at the
bank desk. Examples of non-brnnch-speciftc transactions include ptovisiona, transfers,
and payments which do not need a visit to the branch. If a bank offers its depositors
the phonebanking option, two possibilities exist for the exercise of non-branch-specific
transactions: depositors either phone their bank at a fixed cost r~ 0, or vieit their
bank and face the above transportation cost k plus t per-unit diatance. We will asaume
throughout the analysis that k~ r. This implies that all depositors prefer the phone
4We assume that the number of each type of transaction is already the reault of an optimization
procedure. Their fixed character, however, eimplifies calculation. For a discuesioa, ece section 4. Notice
that introducing more complicated contracta in thia model will not alter our results. Take the caee ot
a fee per (type of) transaction and an interest tate. The fee per (type of) traneaction acts ae a perfect
subetitute for the intereat rate, since the number oftranaactiona ia fixed. Also, spatial diacrimination is
not an alternatíve. Depositors can circumvent thia by making an agreement with someone living cloaer
to the bank.5
option for the non-branch-specific transactiona.b
The other two transactions are non-locatíon-specifec and occur during travelling time.
The notion of non-location-specific means that if a depositor travels to some point on
the circle, he can execute financial transactions from that point. We assume that the
depositors arrive at some place on the circle, according to the uniform distributione
Again, there are branch-specific and non-branch-specific transactiona. Then, the expected
cost for M branch-speciftc traiisactions equais M(k t 4}, since the expecíed diatance to
the depositor's bank is 4. The expected cost for m non-branch-speciftc transactions in
case no phone option is available, is obtained in a similar faehion. ff the phone option ia
available, all depositors prefer it, since k~ r.
If x is bank A's market share, the depositor who is indifferent between two non-
phonebanks A and B is located at x~2 such that
rA-(Hfh)(k-~t2)-(Álfm)(k-f4)-
rB -(H ~- h)(k-t't(1 2 x)) -(M f m)(k ~- 4). (I)
By (1), the non-location-specific transactions do not influence the location of the
indifferent depositor.
The depositor who is indifferent between phonebank A and non-phonebank B is lo-
cated at x~2 such that
rA-H(kft2)-hr-M(k~4)-mr-
rB -(H f h)(k ~- t(1 2 x) )-(M f m)(k f 4). (2)
From (2), the introduction of a phone option for the non-brnnch-specific transactions
clearly has an impact on the marginal depositor choosing between a phonebank and a
non-phonebank. The marginal depositor is willing to accept a lowet deposit rate from
the phonebank if he can benefit from lower costs for his non-brnnch-specéfic transactiona.
The depositor who is indifferent between two phonebanka A and B ia located at x~2
such that
s[n case k G r, best-response functions become kinked and discontinuous such that the existence of
a SPNE in pure sttategies ie not ensured.
sPadilla and Matutee (1993) introduce similar transactions; in their model, depoeitore need caeh
unexpectedly when "travelling" around the city.6
rA-11(k-1-t2)-hr-M(k f 4)-mr-
rB-H(k-}t(ï 2x))- hr-M(k-~4)-mr. (3)
The terms concerning h-, m- and M-transactions disappear. The market sharea x
and ï- x between ~wo phonebanks are determi:.ed hy the interest rates and the H-
transactions.
Some additional notation is introduced before moving to the following section. Denote
by P; phonebank i and by N; non-phonebank i.
3 Solution of the game.
We solve the game for its Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in pure atrategiea by the
method of backward induction. Subsection 3.1 focuses on the equilibria for the game in
atage two, given the decisions by the two banks taken in the first etage. The subgame
perfect equilibria for the two-stage game are presented in subsection 3.2.
3.1 Second Stage Competition: The Choice of Interest R.ates.
There are three subgames' to be considered: two non-phonebanks (N~, NB) (section
3.1.1), one phonebank only (PA, NB) (section 5.1.2) and two phonebanks (PA, PB) (sec-
tion 3.1.3). In order to derive a Nash equilibrium in interest rates for each subgame, we
compute the best response functions for both banks, taking into account that the behav-
ior of the indifferent depositor determines their market share. Section 3.1.4 interprets
the results within and across subgames.
3.1.1 Subgame (Np,NB).
This subgame is comparable to a well-known model of product differentiation on the circle
with linear transportation costs, since every depositor has to execute all transactions at
the branch of his bank. From (1), bank A's market share is
'The same resulte apply for the cases where bank B ie the firot element in the tuple.~- t(H ~- h)(rA - rB } t(H2 h))
Substituting (4) into bank A's profit function, we obtain its beat response function :
(4)
rA - ~(rB - t(H~ h) f R). (5)
In a similar way, one finds the best responae function for bank B. In equilibrium,
each bank captures half of the market, charges the same interest rate rÁ(NA, NB) -
rB(NA, NB) - R-` y2" and obtains as profit
~q(NAi Ne) - ~B(Na, Ne) - t(H4 h). (6)
Equation (6) contains only location-specífic transactions. The m- and M-transactions
disappear because of a Bertrand result : banks are not differentiated with respect to
these non-location-specific transactions.
G insert Table 2 1
Comparative statics for the (NA, NB) case are shown in table 2. An increase in
t enhances both banks' monopoly power, generating lower interest rates and higher
profits. Both types of location-specific transactions reduce the equilibrium intereat rate
and increase profits. Changes in exogenous variables do not affect the equilibrium market
share. The type M-transactions and the difference k-r do not influence the equilibrium
interest rate, market share and profits.
3.1.2 Subgame (Pp,NB).
In the second subgame, only one bank offers the phone option. From (2), bank A's
market share is
y- t(2H f h)
(rA - rB ~- h(k - r) t m(k - r d- 4) ~- t(HZ h) ) (7)8
Substituting (7) into bank A's pcofit function, its beat-response function equals
rA - 2(re - t(H2 h) - h(k - r) - m(k - r t 4) t R)




From (8) and (9) the equilibrium interest rates for this aubgame are :
and
r;~(Pn, Ne) - R- t(H2 h) - 3(k - r) f 6- 3(k - r f 4)
rB(Pa,Ne) - R- t(H2 h) -F 3(k - r) f t3 f 3(k - r f 4) (11)
(10)
The corresponding equilibrium market shares are :
and
~á(Pa,Ne) - t(2H ~ h) (
t(3HS 2h)
f 3(k - r) f 3(k - r f 4)) (12)
yé(Pa, Na) - t(2H t h) (t(3
6f h) - 3(k
- r) - 3(k - r f 4)) (13)
It follows that the equilibrium profite are :
and
n;~(Pn, Na) - t(2H -f h) (
t(3HS 2h) } 3(k - r) ~ 3(k - r t 4))~ (14)
~á(Pa~Ne)-t(2Hfh)(t(3
6}h)-3(k-r)-3(k-rd-4))~. (15)
In this subgame, banks are clearly differentiated with respect to the m-, h- and H-
transactions. As a consequence, these transactions enter into the profit functions.
G insert Table 3 ~
Comparative statics for the (PA, NB) case are summarized in table 3. Higher trans-
portation costs reduce botli banks' intereet ratee. However, they affect the (non-
)phonebank's market share in a(positive) negative way. The overall effect on profita9
is positive for both banks. Location-specific transactions increase the intermediation
rate for both banks. The H-transactions reduce the phonebank's market share to the
advantage of the non-phonebank and dilute the gains from differentiation. The effect
of h-transactions on the interest rate is negative, while the effect on market ehare and
profits is ambiguous. The m-transactiona and the difference in fixed costs k- r reduce
(increase) the (non-)phonebank's interest rate and increase (reduce) market share. They
both unambiguously enhance (reduce) the profits of the (non-) phonebank.
3.1.3 Subgame (PA,PS).
From (3), bank A's market share is
1 tH
z- tH(rA
- rB f 2) (16)
Substituting (16) into bank A's profit function, we can derive its best response function:
rA - 2(re - t2 -~ R) (17)
Bank B's best-response function is similarly derived. In equilibrium, each bank captures
óalf of the market and offers as interest rate
Tq(PAr Pa) - rB(PA~ Pa) - R- trl .
The equilibrium profits are
(18)
tH
~;~(PA, Pa) - ~é(PA, Pe) - 4. (19)
Equation (19) shows that the h-transactions do not enter the profit function for the samelo
reason as the m- and M-transactiona in equation (6). Banke are not differentiated with
respect to the h-transactions, and price competition ca.nnot be relaxed. Conaequently, a
Bertrand result appears.
Comparative statics are summazized in table 4 and are similar to the (NA, NB) case
except for the h-transactions.
G insert Table 4 ~
3.1.4. Interpretation.
Before moving to the first stage, some comparisons can be made about the interest rates
and market shares within and across the different subgamea. Firat, rÁ(PA, NB) can either
be larger or smaller than r;~(NA, NB). This ambiguity stems from two reasons. The firat
is that in the (PA, NB) case more differentiation is introduced vis-à-vis the (N~, NB)
case: all depositors strictly prefer the phone option for their m- and h-transactions
being offered at bank A only. This results in a reduction of A's intereat rate as ehown
by the third and fifth term in equation (10). The same reasoning explains the opposite
obaervation in equation (11) for bank B's interest rate. The other reason is that lesa
differentiation results in banks competing more strenuously for the same depositora:
neighboring depositors become less captive, reaulting in a reduction of their monopoly
power. The fourth component in equations (10) and (11) illustrates this effect. Adding
up both effects generates the above ambiguity for bank A. For bank B, however, no
ambiguity results, since rB(PA, NB) 7 rB(NA, NB). The non-phonebank increasea ita
interest rate on deposits in order not to be driven out of the market.
Second, rB(PA, NB) 1 r;~(PA, NB). Bank A ia differentiated from B and ia able to
use its monopoly power by charging a lower interest rate than its non-phone competitor
can.
Third, rÁ(PA, NB) G rá(Pa,PB). When both banks introduce the phone option,
they are not differentiated with respect to their m- and h-transactiona: a Bertrand
result holds for these transactions. If bank B does not offer the phone option, more
differentiation results. Depositora prefer bank A in order to execute their m- and h-
transactions. Therefore, they become more captive vis-à-vis the situation where both11
banks offer the phone option. This results in a lower interest rate. The same reaeoning
explains why rB(PA, NB) can either be larger or smaller than rB(PA, Pe).
Fourth, r,`(NA, NB) G r,'(PA, PB), with i - A, B. Both banks are differentiated with
respect to their h transactions when both banks do not offer the phone option. This is
not the case if both banks offer the phone option. The introduction of the phone option
unambiguously steps up competition between banks, yielding a higher intereat rate.
Fifth, x;~(PA, Ne) 1 xB(PA, NB). 'I'he phonebank clearly attracts a higher market
share vis-à-vis the subgames (NA, NB) and (PA, PB). Two effecta a can be diatinguished
in case bank A deviates from the (NA, NB) towards the (PA, NH) case. One is the demand
effect (the direct effect) through a change in market share given B's equilibrium interest
rate of the (NA, NB) case. This change equals
xA(PA,Ne)~(N~.Ne)-2A(NA,Ne)-t(2H-~h)(t4 ~h(k-T)f 2(k-Tf4))~0 (20)
and is positive since depositors stríctly prefer to execute their m- and h-traneactions
by phone. The direct effect on profits is positive, since bank A's intereat tate decreases.
The other is the strategic effect (the indirect effect) and capturea the impact on A's (the
phonebank's) profits through the change in B's (the non-phonebank's) interest rate. The
effect on market share is negative and equals
~á(PA, Ne) - ~A(PA, Ne)I(N~.NB) --t(2H f h) (- 6 - 6 (k - T)
- 6(k - T f 4)) C 0.
(21)
The change in interest rate is positive, resulting in a negative atrategic effect on profits.
Adding up equations (20) and (21), the total change in terma of market share becomea
positive : a phonebank competing with a non-phonebank attracta a higher market share.
The total effect on profits, however, is ambiguous.
Sixth, a simple welfare analysis shows that depositors are beat off if both banks offer
the phone option. The introduction of the phone option by only one bank also increases
BSee Tírole (1988, p. 281) for more details on theee two effecte.12
the welfare of the depositors. Both increases in welfare reault from a combination of
the competitive effects between banks and the decrease in tranaportation coata. The
depositors strictly prefer (P, P) to (P, N) and (P, N) to (N, N).
Finally, using the terminology of Fudenberg and 'I'irole (1984), banks act as puppy
dogs in their decision to offer the phone option. According to the above analyais, that
decision negatively (positively) influences the opponent's market ahare (interest rate),
irreapectíve of his first-stage decision. Due to the negative effect on the opponent's
profit, offering the phone is a tough strategy. Since price competition yields atrategic
complements, the puppy dog strategy follows. As a result, banka ahow a tendency towards
underinvestment in the phone technology.
3.2 First Stage Competition: Phone Option Decision.
3.2.1. General Resulta.
In the first stage of the game, the two banka aimultaneously chooae whether to introduce
the phone option or not. They do so knowing that in the second etage they will compete
in deposit rates as described in subsection 5.1. The following propoaition characterizes
all possible SPNE in pure strategies for the overall game. The proof of this propoaition
goes along the following lines. First, we take the candidate equilibria reaulting from our
analysis in the previous section. Second, we compute the SPNE, based on the second-






-2t(3H f 2h) - 4h(k - r) -~ 3t 2(H -~ h)(2H t h}
2t(3H f h) - 4h(k - r) - 3t 2H(2H f h)
m- .
4(k-rf~)
a) if m G m, then no óank introduces the phone option(region I~.
6) if m E[m,m~, then only one óank introduces the phone option (negion II).
c) iJm 1 m, then both banks introduce the phone option (region III).
Proof : straightforward calculations show that x; (P;,N~) C ~r;(N;, N~) if and only if
mCmanda~(P;,P~)G~r~(P;,N~)ifandonlyifmG~rt,i~jandforalli,jE{A,B}.
Notice that m G m.
a) fot m G r~r , we have that ~r;(P;,N~) G~r;(N;, N~ ) and a~(P;,P~) C xj(P;,N~) hold,
resulting in (NA, NB) as the unique SPNE.
b) for m G m G m, we have that a;(P;,Ni) 1~r;(N;, N~) and A~(P;,P~) L x~(P;,N~)
hold. Thia results in (P~, NB) and (N~, PB) as the two SPNE.
c) for m C m, we have that aj(P;,P~) 1 ~r~(P;, N~) and a;(P;,N~) ~ a;(N;, Ni ) hold,
resulting in (PA,PB) as the unique SPNE. ~
G insert Figure 2 ~
Figure 2 illustrates the Proposition for given values of H, h, r and k. We depict t on
the horizontal and m on the vertical axis. Region I describea the parameter conatellations
under which there is an equilibrium without phonebanking. Introducing phonebanking
in that area would be profit decreasing due to the dominance of the losa in market power
on the h transactions. This occurs for small values of m and high values of t. Banks
realize profits on all lacation-specific transactiona.
The parameter constellations satisfying the condition for specialization are given by
region 11. One bank offers the phone option while the other doea not. The phonebank14
obtains the highest profits: although offering a lower interest rate, it attracts a larger
market share compared to the non-phonebank. The phonebank attracts depoaitora that
are willing to pay for the phone option and extracts the difference k- r per transaction
by phone. The h-transactions, however, also reduce the gain from offering the phone.
Specialization occurs whenever tranapottation costs are sufficiently high and m has in-
termediate values. The phonebank is then compensated for the loss it incura from the
reduced differentiation in the h-transactions by the gain of the created differentiation in
the m-transactions. The non-phonebank has no incentivea to deviate aince this would
reduce its profits. It is clear that a coordination problem arisea with respect to who will
become the phonebank. A sequential game where nature decides who moves firat, could
solve this problem.
Region III shows the parameter conatellation where both banka introduce the phone
option: a Prisonner's dilemma situation occurs. Although not introducing the phone
option would be more profitable for both banks, each bank individually decides to offer
the phone option. The gains from the quality difference in the h- and m-transactions
more than compensate for the loss from an increase in competition in the h-transactions.
If one bank does not introduce the phone option, it increasea differentiation but incurs
losses from the qualitative disadvantage. When m is relatively large, not introducing the
phone option reduces profits. As a consequence, both banks offering the phone option
becomes the unique SPNE for region III. In the end, the aubgame equilibrium profits
are lower since banks realize profita only on the H-transactions (see equation (19)). Note
that depositors enjoy an increase both in quality and the interest rate.
An upward-sloping concave curve separatea region 1 from II. The slope can be ex-
plained from equations (6) and (14), where 8rrq(NA,NB)~í3t ~ i~r;~(PA,NB)~í~t for any
(m, t) satisfying this curve. Concavity resulta from 8~x;r(PA, NB)~8m~ 1 0. In a similar
way, one can explain the upward-sloping concave curve separating regions 11 and III.
The size of regions I, II and 11I depende upon the underinveatment effect. The puppy
dog strategy enlarges the set of parametere satiafying regione I and II.
8.2.2. Special casea.15
m- 0. The horizontal axis in figute 2 illustrates this special case. Depositors execute
only location-specific transactions. Both banks offer the phone option for small values
of t, since the qualitative difference would drive a non-phonebank out of the market.
This is not the case for intermediate values of t since the importance of the qualitative
difference on profits diminishes. For high values of t, the impact of the qualitative
difference becomes smaller than the effect of a change in market power such that both
banks do not offer the phone option.
H - h- 0. If depositors execute only non-location-specific transactions, then (PA, NB),
(NA, PB) and (PA, PB) are SPNE. The second-stage intereat rate equilibrium in both the
(PA,Pa) and (NA,NB) case is setting r; - R, with ~r; - 0. In cases (PA,NB) or
(NA, Py), the phonebank drives its non-phone competitor out of the market by setting
R- m(k - r t- ,~` ). (NA, NB) cannot be a SPNE, since one bank is always making strictly
positive profits by unilaterally deviating. If only one bank offers the phone option, the
non-phonebank cannot strictly increase its profits by deviating. The same reaeoning
applies to the (PA, PB) equilibrium. Each SPNE enablea all depoaitora to make use
of the phone option. However, all gains from the phone technology are captured by
depositors when both banks offer the phone option.
H- 0. The results for areas I and II of figure 2 remain intact. Area III, however,
shows three SPNE : (PA, PB), (PA, NB) and (NA, PB). If both banks offer the phone
option, they set interest rates equal to R and realize zero profita. If only one bank offers
the phone optíon, its optimal interest rate ia equal to R- h(k - r f t) - m(k - r~- ~)
such that the non-phonebank is driven out of the market. It follows then that (PA, Pe),
(PA, NB) and (NA, PB) are SPNE for area III. If in addition m- 0, figure 2 reduces to
its horizontal axis and similar results apply.
h- 0. Both banks introducing the phone option is the unique SPNE. Offering the
phone option is a dominant strategy since it implies an increase in market share and a
decrease in the interest rate.16
4 Concluding Remarks.
We have investigated the strategic effecta of phonebanking upon wmpetition in the
market for deposits. Our model shows that diverae Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
occur. Two main effects are responsible for this diveraity. First, offering the phone
option always implies some loss in market power. Second, a phonebank offers a higher
quality far a:l its depositors through a reduction ir. transaction costs. Banks have more
incentives to become phonebanks the higher the quality improvement is. The competitive
effects generate a tendency to underinvest in the phone technology. However, when the
quality difference between a phonebank and non-phonebank becomes too large, the non-
phonebank shifts regime and becomes a phonebank. No bank offera the phone option
if the disadvantage of the reduced market power is not compensated by the gain of the
additional differentiation.
In case only one bank offers the phone option, depositora face a trade off between de-
posit rates and transportation costs. Depositors at the phonebank receive lower interest
rates but enjoy decreased transportation costs. The competitive effects between banka
and the reduction in transportation costa result in a situation in which depositors aze
best off when both banks offer the phone option.
We conclude with three possible extensions. First, if the phone option implies a re-
duction in processing costs, its attractiveness increases. The atrategic effects, however,
remain. Second, one could make the number of financial transactions endogenous, follow-
ing the Baumol-Tobin tradition (see Barro and Santomero (1972), Santomero (1979)).
One expects the average amount of deposits to be higher for the case of a bank offering
the phone option. Therefore, the attractiveness of offering the phone option increasea.
Third, our results also remain valid in a slightly different model where some depositor
heterogeneity with respect to the number of transactiona is introduced. Price competi-
tion is relaxed in the (P, N) case . However, price competition is enhanced in the (P, P)
case such that we conjecture that the overall picture remains robuet.17
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Table 2:~rnnparative Static.9 for the (N~,NB) case.
t H h M m k-r
r; - - - 0 0 0
a,' 0 0 0 0 0 0
~r; f f f 0 0 020
Table 3: Comparative Statics for the (PA,NB) case.
t H h M m k-r
r;~ - - - 0 - -
rB - - - 0 ~- ~-
x;~ - - ? 0 f -F
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Table 4 : C.omparative Static.9 for the (PA,PB~ case.
t H h M m k-r
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